Memorandum Concerning the Citizens of the German Democratic
Republic who Remain at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in
Warsaw
ConfidentialWarsaw, 14 September 1989
I. On 13 September, Minister K. SkubiszewskiSkubiszewski received the Director of the MFA’s Political
Department KastrupDieter Kastrup
Political Director in the
FRGFederal Republic of Germany Foreign Ministry, 1988–1991.
, who arrived in Poland as Minister GenscherHans-Dietrich Genscher
Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
FRGFederal Republic of Germany 1.10.1982–17.5.1992.
’s special envoy to discuss the group of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens
remaining at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw. The talks were also attended by Ambassador
SchoellerFranz Jochen Schoeller
Ambassador of the
FRGFederal Republic of Germany in Warsaw 1987–1989.
and Deputy Director of the MFA’s 4th
Department SułekJerzy Sułek
Deputy Director of the 4th Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from May 1990 Director of the Polish MFA’s Europe Department.
.
Director Kastrup explained that the aim of his trip to Poland was to hold talks with
over 50 GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens who are currently at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw and seeking to
leave for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany for a permanent stay, and to present the official position of the
West German side to the Polish authorities.
He referred to a conversation between Minister Genscher and L. WałęsaLech Wałęsa
Chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” and President of Poland 22.12.1990–22.12.1995.
held in Bonn on
8 September, during which the West German foreign minister praised the Hungarian
authorities for their approach to the departure of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens from the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy
in Budapest and the Hungarian territory for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany via Austria, and requested L.
Wałęsa, as a representative of the new Poland, to apply “the Hungarian solution” to
the group of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens remaining at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw. At the same time,
Minister Genscher emphasized the historic importance of this issue for the West-East
relationship in Europe, and to human rights in general. According to Kastrup, L.
Wałęsa promised Genscher that the “Hungarian model” would be followed in Poland.
Director Kastrup made it clear that the FRGFederal Republic of Germany would not set out German legal positions
in the case at hand (“it would be irrelevant which travel documents entitled the GDRGerman Democratic Republic
citizens to leave Poland”). The FRGFederal Republic of Germany would prefer a pragmatic solution that took
account of humanitarian considerations. To that end, they would be ready to get the
Polish Red Cross, the German Red Cross and possibly also the International Committee
of the Red Cross in Geneva on board. Both Kastrup and Ambassador Schoeller expressed
their hope that the Polish authorities would show understanding and support for West
German efforts to arrange the departure of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany. They emphasized
that the focus of attention of the West German public and media was on the GDRGerman Democratic Republic
citizens at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw, just as it was for those at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in
Prague. In reply to Minister Skubiszewski’s question, Director Kastrup described the
Hungarian authorities’ decision to allow GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens to leave for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany en masse
as a “humanitarian gesture in a European spirit”. In this context, he recalled
Genscher’s words to the Hungarian authorities: “We will never forget what you
did.”
Minister Skubiszewski observed that the Polish side was also in favour of a pragmatic
and humanitarian solution to the issue of the GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens remaining at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany
Embassy in Warsaw. From our standpoint, the best option would be an amicable
settlement reached by the East and West German authorities, one that would respect
the interests of both governments as well as the people concerned. Poland advocated
the observance of human rights, including the principle of free flow of people. In
the case at hand, however, we had to bear in mind the good of Poland’s relations with
West and East Germany. He explained that he had not had the opportunity to
familiarize himself with the content of Minister Genscher’s conversation with L.
Wałęsa. The stance of the Polish authorities would be determined by arrangements to
be made directly by the governments of the two German states with respect to the GDRGerman Democratic Republic
citizens remaining at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw.
Director Kastrup recalled that the FRGFederal Republic of Germany had held talks with the GDRGerman Democratic Republic about the East
German citizens staying at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Permanent Representation in Berlin and at FRGFederal Republic of Germany
diplomatic missions accredited in socialist countries. In contrast to the
arrangements that had regulated similar cases in the past, this time the GDRGerman Democratic Republic
authorities were reluctant to issue a “silent guarantee” allowing such people to
leave for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany (the GDRGerman Democratic Republic’s policy at the time had been to “consider favourably”
applications for an exit permit). This time round, the GDRGerman Democratic Republic would only be willing to
guarantee its citizens staying at the Embassies in Prague and Warsaw (until recently
also Budapest) that after their return to the GDRGerman Democratic Republic, they would avoid punishment or
consequences at their workplace, and would be granted representation by a lawyer when
they appeared before East German administrative authorities. What the GDRGerman Democratic Republic authorities
would not accept was that such citizens should be able to leave a third state
directly for the FRGFederal Republic of Germany, as had been happening under “the Hungarian solution”.
Consequently, people who were staying at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw could only have “a
very vague hope” of leaving for West Germany. In Kastrup’s view, the GDRGerman Democratic Republic authorities
were unlikely to change their position at that stage, which was why talks between
both German states had stalled.
Minister Skubiszewski concluded the meeting by reiterating that we appreciated the
importance of the humanitarian aspect involved in the issue of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens remaining
at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw, and were aware of the possible ramifications for our
relations with West and East Germany. He promised to look into the matter and give a
concrete reply setting out the Polish position.
II. On 13 September, Director Kastrup and Ambassador Schoeller were also
received by J. CzyrekJózef Czyrek
member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party and Minister of State in the Office of the Polish President 1989–1991.
, the
Minister of State at the President’s Office. One of the topics discussed was the
problem of over 50 GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens staying at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw and wanting to
leave for West Germany.
Director Kastrup emphasized that he was aware of the fundamental differences on legal
matters between the People’s Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Even so, the West German side sought a pragmatic solution with humanitarian
dimensions. Minister Czyrek asked for an explanation of the political context of the
problem, given recent declarations by the Federal Republic of Germany that it was not
interested in destabilizing the GDRGerman Democratic Republic, and was keen to ensure the appropriate standards
in that country in order to stem emigration. Did the current situation point to a
shift in West German policy? (The FRGFederal Republic of Germany was creating many incentives to encourage
immigration). K[astrup] emphasized that “human matters”
could not be separated from politics. Young East Germans saw no opportunities for
themselves (this went beyond mere economic motivation); they had been following news
about the progress of reforms in the USSRUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland and Hungary. Meanwhile, the current
East German leadership was unable to solve these problems. “Mass fleeing” had its
roots solely in the GDRGerman Democratic Republic, so a policy change in the FRGFederal Republic of Germany was not a factor here. K[astrup] underscored that he was requesting “humanitarian
assistance in solving this problem, while taking account of human rights”. Minister
Czyrek replied that he appreciated the humanitarian dimension of the issue. We would
not try to “turn it into a problem”. From the logical and substantive points of view,
this was primarily a matter to be settled between East and West Germany, however, and
as such should be resolved by way of an understanding between the two countries. Such
an understanding would be decisive for Poland, as we could be loyal both to the FRGFederal Republic of Germany
and GDRGerman Democratic Republic. Minister Czyrek referred to Minister Skubiszewski’s decision as presented
during the talks with K[astrup] , whereby a working group
would be set up as a matter of urgency to draft proposals for a Polish position.
Minister Czyrek went on to underline that the matter was very difficult for Poland,
as we viewed our friendly relations with the GDRGerman Democratic Republic as a serious issue and, unlike
Hungary, we have no direct border with any Western states.
III. Conclusions
a) The issue of GDRGerman Democratic Republic citizens remaining at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw could have
negative repercussions for either of the two German states, depending on which
solution we support. If we side with the GDRGerman Democratic Republic, we risk negative effects in the context
of KohlHelmut Kohl
Chancellor of the
FRGFederal Republic of Germany 1.10.1982–27.10.1998.
’s visit to Poland2; if we
go along with West German proposals, the political fallout could affect our
relationship with the GDRGerman Democratic Republic.
b) From our point of view, the best way out would be if the two German states
achieved an amicable settlement between themselves. At this stage, however, such a
solution is unlikely and we are under permanent pressure from representatives of both
countries (see J. MąkosaJerzy Mąkosa
Director of the 1st Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1989–1990.
’s memo of 12 September on the conversation with GDRGerman Democratic Republic Ambassador J.
van ZwollJürgen van Zwoll
Ambassador of the
GDRGerman Democratic Republic in Warsaw 1988–1990.
).
c) In these circumstances, the MFA has set up a working group headed by B.
KulskiBolesław Kulski
Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1988–1990.
to come up with possible solutions. What could prove helpful for
us would be a solution to be adopted in the next few days in the similar case in
Prague.
d) One should bear in mind that the problem will continue to grow (the number of GDRGerman Democratic Republic
citizens at the FRGFederal Republic of Germany Embassy in Warsaw increased to 50 in the course of two
weeks).